This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers. Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products that are sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. We extend recent theoretical work and show the type of rate regulatory system and the stringency of regulatory price constraints interact with the optimal capital structure of an insurance company. The model predicts insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. Further, we show that the tighter or more stringent are regulatory pricing constraints, the higher the level of leverage an insurer will choose because the benefits of holding higher amounts of capital is suppressed. We test these hypotheses using cross-sectional and time-series data on insurers and demonstrate that insurers subject to tighter price regulation maintain higher levels of leverage.
I. Introduction
Researchers have long hypothesized there exists an important interaction between the pricing choices of regulators that set rates in regulated environments and the capital structure decisions of firms which operate in those markets. The general consensus that can be drawn from the theory is the existence of price regulation in the output market provides the regulated entity with incentives to utilize additional levels of debt to finance the operations of the firm. Data on regulated industries such as cable television, local telephone, electricity generation, and natural gas distribution, find considerable empirical evidence consistent the predictions from the theory -rate regulation creates an incentive for firms to increase their debt levels.
1
Although the impact of rate regulation on the capital structure decisions of non-financial corporations has been extensively studied, no comparable research exists documenting the interaction between the regulation of rates and the capital structure decisions of property-liability insurers.
2 This is somewhat surprising given the importance of the industry as a means to allocate risk across the economy and because of the significant impact the regulation of rates has had in insurance markets.
Likewise, since a primary objective of insurance regulation should be to minimize the deadweight costs associated with insolvencies, an understanding of the interaction between the regulation of insurance prices and the decisions of insurance company managers to possibly reduce capital levels is particularly relevant.
1 See, for example, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) , Taggart (1985) , Rao and Moyer (1994) , and Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) . 2 Although few jurisdictions actually "set" rates for auto and workers' compensation insurance, regulators in many states impose binding constraints on the rates insurers are allowed to charge.
We seek to fill this void and conduct an empirical investigation of how the regulation of insurance rates interacts with the financial and investment decisions of profit-maximizing insurer's.
Departing from previous studies investigating the impact of rate regulation in insurance at the state level (e.g., Grabowski, Viscusi and Evans, 1989; Harrington, 1987; Tennyson, 1997) , we conduct our analysis investigating the responses of individual firms. We develop and test hypotheses drawn from the literature using a data set of insurers subject to varying levels of regulation depending on the lines and states in which they write business. We find a positive relationship between the proportion of the firm's business that is subject to rate regulation and its leverage, i.e., the ratio of the firm's capital to its liabilities. In addition, insurers operating in stringently regulated markets maintain even higher leverage than do moderately regulated firms. Finally, in addition to capital structure differences, we document other significant differences between regulated versus unregulated insurers suggesting the incentives for firms to alter their investment and operational decisions in the presence of regulation has many dimensions.
In conducting this study we add to the literature in three important ways. First, the U.S.
insurance industry provides an ideal subject to study the interaction between rate regulation and capital structure because it produces a relatively homogenous product in a variety of regulatory environments. This offers an advantage over previous empirical studies investigating how firms react when the regulatory environment is changed from one regime to another (e.g. the airlines, trucking, railroads, and telecommunication industries). These analyses are likely confounded because the deregulation of prices often accompanies other regulatory changes that presumably also changes the firm's opportunity set. 3 We avoid this problem by conducting a cross-sectional analysis of insurers'
capital levels under different state regulatory systems and controlling for other variables expected to affect leverage. Thus, finding results consistent with the prior literature adds credibility to the earlier results that a decrease in leverage following deregulation was due, at least in part, to a regulatory influence effect and not solely due to a change in the growth opportunities for the firm.
The second manner in which this paper deepens our understanding of the price regulation and capital structure interaction is because of the particular form of debt capital issued by insurerspolicyholder liabilities. Unlike non-financial firms, the debt holder of an insurance company is also the consumer. Thus, the incentive for firms to utilize additional leverage in regulated environments is not being driven a desire to reduce the divisible surplus between the firm (debt and equity holders) and consumers as suggested by Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) . Our results are more consistent with the philosophy underlying the predictions that can be drawn from the equilibrium bargaining model of Spiegel and Spulber (1994) who argue the lack of equity capital in the firm mitigates regulatory opportunism and increases the regulator's commitment to allow higher rate structures.
Finally, our findings are important because although regulators and insurers may recognize that solvency and price regulatory policies can conflict, the interaction of price and solvency regulation is most commonly understood in terms of insurer losses and the depletion of their capital. Our results suggest that insurers further adjust to different regulatory policies by varying their desired or target capital and leverage to reduce their vulnerability to the loss of their capital, due to regulatory expropriation or other causes. This phenomenon exacerbates the potential negative impact of overly stringent price regulation on insurers' financial and solvency and solidity. We should note that, although our results imply that insurers actively adjust their leverage to regulation, this could occur in several ways. Insurers with higher relative amounts of capital may reduce their business or even exit markets subject to regulatory price suppression. In turn, more highly leveraged insurers may take communication, Laber (1988) finds that leverage has no impact on the allowed rate of return on equity. However, his results are likely influenced by both the deregulation of rates and the changing opportunities over business dropped by insurers seeking to reduce their exposure. Also, insurers electing or forced to remain in these markets may seek to expose less capital or choose not to replace capital lost due to rate suppression.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the relevant institutional characteristics of insurance regulatory systems and summarize the findings of previous studies of the effects of insurance price regulation. In Section III, we review the theoretical literature on the interaction between capital structure and rate regulation and then develop the principal hypotheses to be tested in this paper. Section IV presents our methodology and empirical results. We conclude by discussing the policy implications of our study.
II. Rate Regulation in Insurance Background and Institutional Framework
Although solvency has been a principal focus of insurance regulation since its inception in the early 1800s, prices came under regulatory purview when rate wars and conflagrations contributed to a number of insurer insolvencies (Kimball and Heaney, 1995) . Initially, the goal of rate regulation was to ensure a collusive rate that would prevent insurers from engaging in unrestricted, and ultimately, destructive competition (Joskow 1973) . Rate regulatory policy evolved over time and two important trends emerged after World War II. First, the system of "cartel rating" began to erode as insurers were given increasing flexibility in setting prices and competing, constrained by regulationimposed price ceilings rather than price floors. Some states went further and effectively removed price ceilings for many property-liability lines, including personal auto insurance. Ironically, other states tightened price ceilings to court favor among voters and consumers. Hence, a wide variation in state rate regulatory systems and policies developed that has persisted to the present.
for individual firms due to the divestiture of AT&T.
There are at least two dimensions to insurance rate regulation that must be considered, as well as their interaction. The first dimension is the statutory or nominal system that governs insurers' prices for a particular line. Two basic approaches can be distinguished: 1) prior approval; and 2) competitive rating. Under prior approval, regulators typically exert a high degree of control over the prices that insurers are allowed to charge. This is most often accomplished by requiring insurers to file their rates and have them approved by regulators before they become effective. Regulators may disapprove an insurer's rate filing or require it to be modified before it is approved. Needless to say, regulators are more likely to disapprove or reduce rate increases than oppose rate decreases. 4 In a few instances, the state actually sets the rates for insurers with essentially the same effect as with prior approval.
Under competitive rating, regulators typically let market forces rule insurers' pricing and rarely intervene to disapprove or modify the rates insurers choose to implement. Even in competitive rating systems, insurers are still compelled to file their rates under a "file and use" or "use and file"
approach that provides regulators some oversight authority if they choose to exercise it. 5 However, most state competitive rating laws require regulators to show that there is a lack of competition in the market to sustain limits on insurers' rates. Researchers typically classify schemes falling into the prior approval category as "regulated" systems and other systems as non-regulated (See Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans,1989; Harrington, 1987; Tennyson, 1997; and Suponcis and Tennyson, 1998) .
The second dimension of rate regulation is the stringency of the limits that regulators may impose on insurers' rates. For example, even under a prior approval system, some regulators may approve the rates initially filed by insurers and rarely, if ever, disapprove rate filings or seek to reduce insurers' rates. On the other hand, some regulators may impose moderate or severe ceilings on insurers' rates. Rate suppression is likely to be more common and severe when insurers' costs are escalating rapidly and they become a politically salient issue among consumers and voters (Meier 1988 
Impact of Regulation on Insurance Markets
The majority of academic research suggests that since the mid-1970s, the regulation of prices in the market for property-liability insurance tends to suppress rates by several percentage points.
Although the reductions in price are relatively small on average, the research also shows that a number of jurisdictions have engaged in especially stringent regulation which has led to significant dislocations in the availability and quality of coverage (e.g. Klein 1986; Harrington 1987; Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans 1989; and Klein, Nordman, and Fritz 1993) . Thus, considerable evidence exists which suggests some jurisdictions attempt to keep the price of insurance artificially low and that they appear to have some success in doing so.
Stringent price regulation has had a number of (possibly unintended) consequences on insurance markets in states that adopted interventionist policies. For example, studies of private passenger automobile insurance by Harrington (1987) and Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) show that regulation decreases prices more for insurers that employ independent agency systems to distribute their products than for those insurers that use exclusive agents (i.e., direct writers). In addition, direct writers tend to have lower market shares in regulated states. This result has been attributed to the disincentive for direct writers to make large investments in building marketing systems in regulated states (Joskow 1973 ) or, as Gron (1995 has argued, because rate regulation reduces price competition, and thus, reduces the comparative advantages direct writers have to offer insurance at lower prices.
Other authors have looked at the effect rate regulation has on the structure of state insurance markets. Harrington (1992) suggests concerns about future regulation may prevent entry if insurers incur sunk costs to enter new markets. Similarly, incumbent firms may reduce their market shares in response to stringent regulation. Tennyson (1997) finds that rate regulation is negatively related to the number of firms in a state and that states with stringent regulation are less concentrated because large firms respond to severe rate-suppression regulation by reducing their business in a state.
Researchers have also investigated the contribution of rate regulation to the underwriting cycle. Cummins and Outreville (1987) suggest that the time required for regulators' approval of rates, along with the time that elapses between when policies are sold and claims are paid and accounting factors, delay rate adjustments and cause price increases to lag behind increases in loss costs, and vice versa.
They suggest that rate regulation exacerbates the cycle by delaying necessary rate increases (decreases) when losses are relatively high (low). 7 Although Tennyson (1991) did not find evidence that rate regulation causes the cycle, she did find that rate regulation increases the volatility of the loss ratio (the ratio of incurred losses to premiums earned). 6 The potential impact of residual market rate regulation on the voluntary market depends on how easy it is for buyers to use the residual market. If buyers insurable in the voluntary market are not barred from obtaining a lower rate in the residual market, this can suppress rates in the voluntary market.
7 See Harrington (1984) for further discussion of the regulatory lag hypothesis.
Examining the structure and performance of the workers' compensation insurance market, Carroll (1993) suggests that rate regulation implicitly creates a price ceiling which keeps rates low. As price ceilings fall, the size of residual market increases. Danzon and Harrington (2000) also investigate the workers' compensation insurance market and shows regulatory rate suppression leads to higher claim costs for two reasons. First, rate suppression discourages employers from investing in loss control because the premiums they pay do not fully reflect their expected loss costs. Second, rate suppression also prompts insurers to reduce loss control expenditures, even if doing so results in higher losses.
Insurers face this disincentive to invest in loss control because the increase in losses can be grounds to request higher rates while the reduction in expenditures contributes to insurers' profits. Danzon and Harrington also find stringent rate regulation leads to larger involuntary markets, consistent with the outcome in stringently regulated private passenger automobile insurance markets.
This body of work makes a strong case that price regulation has significant effects on insurance markets, particularly when regulatory price ceilings are very stringent. With the considerable evidence on the effects of regulation on prices, profitability, availability and market structure, it is reasonable to ask whether its effects also extend to insurers' financial structures. If regulation can reduce profits and increase financial risk for insurers, we might expect insurers to respond strategically to regulatory policies designed to minimize the potential harm to the value of the firm.
In addition, the theoretical literature on capital structure and price regulation suggests the use of additional leverage provides incentives for regulators to maintain more reasonable pricing structures than they might otherwise. We turn to that discussion next.
III. Capital Structure Decision-Making By Insurers in Price Regulated Markets
The theory presented in this section is an extension of the work by Spiegel and Spulber (1994) and Dasgupta and Nanda (1993) as applied to an insurance entity. Our purpose is to form the intuition for the testable hypotheses and not to present a rigorous discussion of the theory. The predictions are similar to those in the prior literature and readers interested in the formal development of the model are requested to read the aforementioned papers and Shiu (2000) for more details.
We begin by assuming that an insurer underwrites a line of insurance in a market subject to price regulation. We assume regulation operates in a predictable way such that insurers can incorporate the regulators' decision process in their value functions. Our goal is to show that insurers will make their capital structure decision in anticipation of how regulators set prices.
Insurers are assumed to commit capital S, taking into account the prices regulators are expected to pick. Since regulators set rates, insurers are considered to be price takers. Insurance regulators exercise considerable discretion in setting premium rates. In this model, we assume regulators set price to maximize a weighted utilitarian social welfare function that is the sum of consumer surplus and weighted producer surplus. Producer surplus is proxied by firm value. Thus, the social welfare function is and regulators will maximize producers' profit and set the price equal to the monopoly price (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) .
The regulatory process is modeled as a two-stage game with two players: insurers and regulators.
In the first stage regulated insurers choose the amount of financial capital they will allocate to a regulated line of insurance. In the second stage the price of insurance is set by regulators to maximize the weighted social welfare function. We assume regulators behave rationally given their choice of b>0 and use a backward induction procedure to solve the model.
Define X to be the mean loss per exposure where X is a random variable with the probability density function f(X). For simplicity, the distribution of X is assumed to be independent of the number of policies sold. The company is insolvent if total losses are greater than the sum of revenue and capital. Therefore, insolvency occurs when
A critical value X* is defined such that
When the revealed value of X<X*, companies are solvent. We define the probability of bankruptcy as
1-F(X*).
The value of a firm is assumed to equal its profits, net of the opportunity cost of capital. The model of firm value is adopted from Cagle and Harrington (1995) .
where i is the cost of capital.
Regulators Pricing Strategies
Regulators are assumed to maximize the following social welfare function by choosing p, such
The welfare-maximizing price is found by setting the first order condition of equation (5) equal to zero with respect to price,
Equation (6) leads to our first proposition Proposition 1. When regulators consider consumer and producer surplus to be perfect substitutes, (b=1), and there is no possibility of insolvency (F(X*)=1), the optimal regulated price will equal the mean of the loss distribution. I.e., p*=X. Otherwise, if there is a positive probability of insolvency, F(X*)<1, then p*<X.
Proof:
When F(X*)=1 then producer surplus is
Thus, regulators maximize the following welfare function
The first order condition becomes
10 Assume that the concavity of the welfare function holds.
Since b=1, then p*=X. Thus, given b=1 and F(X*)=1, the optimal regulated price equals marginal cost.
When F(X*)<1, equation (6) can be rearranged as follows
Given b=1, and F(X*)<1, the left-hand side is positive. It follows that p*<X since Q p (p)<0. In addition, the more likely is the firm's insolvency, the greater the difference between p* and X.
Thus, when the weight placed on consumer surplus and producer surplus is equal, and there is no possibility of insolvency, the optimal regulatory price will equal the marginal cost of writing the insurance, p*=X. Because regulators trade-off the marginal benefits and costs of changing price as suggested in equation (6), higher probabilities of insolvency will lead the regulator to set price below X, recognizing the possibility that policyholders may not be fully reimbursed.
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We next consider the case where the regulator's welfare weight is biased against the insurer (i.e.,
b < 1).
12 In doing so we show regulators will hold price below the competitive level. Doing creates excess demand in the market and distorts the Pareto optimal allocation of capital to the insurance market.
Proposition 2. When regulators are biased against producers, the optimal regulated price is increasing with the regulators' weight on producer surplus, i.e., 0 b p
11 It is possible that p*=X when there is a positive probability of insolvency if 1-bF(X*)=0. However, this can only occur with b>1.
12 Harrington (1987) and Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) suggest rate suppression is more apparent in states with stringent regulation as do many others (e.g., Klein, 1986; Klein, Nordman, and Fritz, 1993; Carroll, 1993; and Danzon and Harrington, 2000) . In addition, according to public information on the regulatory disposition of advisory rate and loss cost filings over the last decade (for personal auto and workers' compensation insurance), regulators often require substantial reductions in the The effect of a change in regulators' weight for producer surplus on p* can be found by differentiating equation (6) 
The effect of a biased regulator also has an effect on the supply of private market insurance. To Proposition 3. When b<1 and the regulated price is set below the equilibrium price, the more weight regulators put on producer surplus, the higher the quantity of insurance sold, i.e.,
Since b<1, p * is below the competitive price and the supply constraint is binding. Since supply increases with the optimal regulated price, i.e.
Propositions 2 and 3 are important because they demonstrate the tradeoff faced by regulators between the costs associated with restricting the supply of private market insurance by the industry vs. increasing the price for insurance faced by consumers.
Proposition 4. When regulators are biased against insurers, b<1, the effect of increasing capital by the insurer on the pricing decision of the regulator is indeterminate and will be a function of the surplus-to-revenue ratio ( ) (
) and the price elasticity of supply. loss costs or rates initially filed. This is especially true when advisory organizations and insurers file for large increases in loss costs or rates because claim costs are escalating rapidly.
Proof:
be the price elasticity of supply. Then,
Since 0 ≥ ξ q p l , the sign of equation (13) is undetermined and will depend on the product of the price elasticity of supply and the surplus-to-revenue ratio. If the product of the surplus-to-revenue ratio and the price elasticity of supply is greater than one, then increasing capital will lower the regulated price. When the firm has committed more capital to the regulated line, the sensitivity of the regulated price with respect to a change in the amount of capital will either be small or negative.
However, when the insurer is financially vulnerable, that is, it has not committed much surplus to the regulated insurance market, an increase in surplus is likely to lead to an increase in price. Although equation (13) 
Regulated Firms' Strategies
We now consider the first stage of the game and solve for how much capital the shareholders will commit to support writing business in a regulated line of insurance. We assume insurers maximize the value of the firm by choosing capital, subject to a minimum capital requirement S . That is, when b<1, regulated insurers will maximize the following value function by choosing S subject to minimum capital requirement S .
To gain some intuition about the regulated firm's optimal strategy, consider the first-order condition when the constraint S S ≥ is not binding. In this case the first-order condition of equation (14) with respect to S will be
where
is shown in equation (13). 13 Since Vp and the right-hand-side of (15) incentive to keep surplus to revenue ratio low. In doing so, increases in capital to a regulated line of insurance will encourage the regulator to increase price.
IV. Empirical Analysis
The theory presented in Section III suggests two important testable hypotheses regarding the interaction between the price regulatory environment in which an insurer operates and its capital structure decisions:
Hypothesis 1: Insurers operating in states and lines of insurance subject to price regulation will have greater leverage than will insurers operating in unregulated environments.
Hypothesis 2: Regulated insurers operating in harsher regulatory environments will have greater leverage than will regulated insurers operating in states with less stringent price regulation.
In this section we report the results of our empirical tests designed to examine the price regulation and capital structure interaction. The tests are conducted using cross-sectional data of U.S. property-liability insurers whose businesses are subject to varying degrees of price regulation. Some of the insurers in our data set sell in states and lines of insurance such that no portion of their business is subject to price regulation. At the other extreme, the data set also includes insurers for which 100 percent of the firm's premium volume is subject to price regulation. In addition, the degree of regulatory intervention varies significantly across the states that regulate rates. Thus, variation in the amount of the insurer's premium volume subject to price regulation, and the extent to which prices are suppressed in differing states and lines of insurance, provides an ideal environment in which to test hypotheses regarding the interaction between the regulatory environment and the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing firms
The primary data source for this study is the 1997 National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Data Tapes. The tapes contain demographic and statutory accounting information filed with state regulators on almost every licensed property-liability insurer operating in the U.S.. 14 We supplement the NAIC data with information on the insurer's distribution system and group affiliation taken from the A.M. Best's Property Casualty Key Rating Guide (1997 Edition) . The identity of the state regulatory systems and the disposition of advisory organization rate filings were obtained from several sources described in detail below.
Dependent Variables
We investigate two definitions of leverage in this study. Consistent with the majority of academic work on capital structure, our first dependent variable is an overall leverage ratio defined as total liabilities of the insurer relative to its surplus. Our second measure of leverage, the Kenney ratio, equals the insurer's net premiums written divided by surplus. We report results investigating this measure of leverage as the Kenney ratio is widely used by regulators and company managers as an 14 The NAIC data tapes contain all multi-state insurers and most single-state insurers. It also contains information on various state-sponsored funds although they are not included in this analysis.
overall gauge of the financial strength of insurers.
15 Although a common metric in the insurance industry, the Kenney ratio does not completely reflect insurer financial strength since, by construction, the measure assumes the surplus of the insurer is dedicated to support only the current business of the insurer. In reality, insurer surplus is available to bond the promises on policies sold during previous years as well as the future obligations of the firm. Thus, in our empirical analysis, we base most of our conclusions upon the results investigating the overall leverage ratio.
Measuring the Degree of Regulation
Our proxy for the degree to which the business of an insurer is subject to price regulation equals the percentage of the insurer's premiums written in states and lines of insurance that require prior approval or premiums written in states that promulgate rates (Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans, 1989; Harrington, 1987; Tennyson, 1997; and Suponcic and Tennyson, 1998 The second hypothesis suggests the harshness of the regulatory environment will be related to insurer capital structure decisions. We explored several ways to proxy for the stringency of the regulation, as the extent of the regulatory bias towards artificially lowering prices cannot be observed directly. Our first proxy for regulatory stringency equals the size of the residual market in private passenger automobile and workers' compensation insurance in the state. We employ this measure as a proxy for stringency as Grabowski, Viscusi, and Evans (1989) show stringently regulated states tend to have larger automobile residual markets. Carroll (1993) and Danzon and Harrington (2000) find a similar phenomenon in workers' compensation insurance. We focus our attention on workers' compensation and private passenger automobile insurance as these markets have historically been the most heavily regulated.
Using the size of the residual market in each state, we define two stringency variables: STRINGDUM jk was set equal to one for the six (five) states with the largest residual markets in private passenger automobile insurance (workers' compensation insurance) and zero otherwise. 16 We chose cutoffs to determine a stringently versus a non-stringently regulated state by looking for a cluster of states with significantly larger residual markets than the remaining states. Using the size of the residual market, instead of the indicator variable, allows us to test a continuous version of the stringency variable.
Our second proxy for the harshness of the regulatory environment in a state is based on an index of regulatory intervention known as the External Climate Index (ECI). Published by Conning & 16 The six jurisdictions identified to have significantly larger residual markets in private passenger automobile insurance were New York, North Carolina, Massachusetts, South Carolina, the District of Columbia, and Maryland. The five states identified as stringently regulated jurisdictions for workers' compensation insurance are Tennessee, New Hampshire, Alaska, South Carolina, and Kansas. Company (1998) , the ECI is a composite of several indicators of the operating environment in each state including the type of rating law for various lines, the commissioner status (elected versus appointed), and the ratio of insurance department full time employees to the number of insurers.
17
The index ranges from 1 to 5 with higher values implying more stringent external environments.
Conning assigns an index for personal lines and for commercial lines. Using the ECI, we define two stringency variables similar to the ones described above. STRINGCON is constructed by identifying the cluster of states with abnormally high ECI values while CONNING is constructed by replacing the size of the residual market with the ECI value in equation above.
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Our third proxy for regulatory stringency is derived from data on regulatory disapprovals of advisory loss cost filings submitted by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) for workers' compensation insurance and the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for private passenger automobile insurance. The advisory filings are intended to provide a suggested overall rate or loss cost change that insurers may use or modify in their rate filings after the advisory filing has been approved by regulators. It is reasonable to assume regulators favor consumers to a greater extent when they reject the rates or lost costs filed by advisory organizations.
19 For private passenger 17 Note, prior to 1997 Conning & Company constructed the External Climate Index using the results of industry surveys requesting industry executives to rank the states in terms of their regulatory "restrictiveness."
18 States with ECI values greater than four were defined as stringent regulators. Based upon this criterion, Delaware, Nevada, Massachusetts, New Jersey, North Carolina, Washington, and Mississippi were defined to heavily regulated private passenger automobile insurance. Likewise, Delaware, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Mississippi were defined to as harsh regulatory environments for workers' compensation insurance. 19 In preparing a loss cost filing, ISO will calculate an indicated loss cost change, a filed loss cost change, and ultimately, an approved loss cost change. The indicated change reflects the loss cost adjustment suggested by ISO's actuarial analysis. Regulators may reject ISO's loss cost filing if they believe that it is not justified and/or they wish to lower or prevent rate increases for consumers. Often, ISO will file for a smaller loss cost increase than that indicated by actuarial analysis to come closer to what regulators may be willing to approve. The approved change reflects the loss costs that regulators will allow ISO to promulgate in advisory circulars and the approved advisory loss costs that individual insurers will be allowed to reference in their rate filings. automobile insurance, we use the advisory rate/loss cost filing information for the period 1991-1997.
For workers' compensation insurance, we use the advisory rate filing information for the period 1986-1991. 20 Although the data from both sources cover periods of time prior to our study, it is reasonable to surmise that insurers base their perception of regulatory stringency on the cumulative experience with the regulator over a period of time.
Using the loss cost filings data, we define two variables to measure regulatory stringency. The NCCI data do not include information for states with monopoly state funds and states with independent rating organizations, and the ISO data do not include loss cost information for states with their own rating bureau. We attempted to obtain data for years 1992 -1997 but were unsuccessful. the percentage of premium by state weighted by the difference between the rate change approved and the rate change filed, relative to the rate change filed.
Control Variables
Our models include additional variables designed to control for various effects the theoretical and empirical literature suggests are likely to influence the capital structure decisions made by insurers.
We include two variables to control for the effect of organizational form on insurers' leverage decisions. The first is an indicator variable for mutual and reciprocal insurers. We hypothesize that mutual and reciprocal insurers will hold less leverage as these firms do not have direct access to external capital markets. Thus, obtaining additional capital following a large loss event for a mutual is likely to be costly relative to stock insurers. The higher cost associated with raising external capital raises the value of internal capital for the mutual and thus leads to our prediction.
We also include a control for insurers organized as a Lloyds association. The defining characteristic associated with Lloyds is the merging of the owner and managerial functions. This combination of functions provides the owner's of a Lloyds with strong incentives to adopt risky strategies due to the convexity of the owner/manager's payoff. However, policyholders with full information should recognize this incentive and will penalize firms with low prices for firms they suspect are likely to adopt risky strategies. To avoid this penalty, Garven (1999) suggests Lloyds insurers can signal their commitment to avoid high-risk strategies by holding lower leverage. Thus, following Garven, we hypothesize Lloyds insurers will hold lower leverage, all else equal.
We control for the distribution system employed by the insurer by including an indicator for insurers that employ exclusive agency distribution systems. The expected sign on the coefficient is ambiguous as the literature offers alternative views of the interaction between distribution systems and incentives for insurer risk taking. Regan and Tennyson (1995) suggest insurers with independent agents have a comparative advantage in specializing in markets with heterogeneous risks since independent agents have stronger incentives to elicit information during the underwriting process.
However, since ownership of the renewal rights resides with the agent, insurers have an incentive limit their use of leverage to the extent agents are likely to move policyholders from one insurer to another should firm's credit quality deteriorate. Alternatively, Harrington (1992) and Suponcic and Tennyson (1998) suggest insurers employing exclusive agency systems require larger sunk costs in firm-specific assets -the value of which would be lost if the firm becomes insolvent. This line of reasoning suggests insurers using exclusive agents will have lower leverage ratios to avoid losing the quasi-rents associated with the firm-specific assets.
Variables equal to the proportion of the insurer's investments in common stocks and in bonds are included to control for insurer's investing in asset classes more volatile than cash. We also control for earnings volatility by including a variable equal to the standard deviation of the error term from an OLS regression of the firm's earnings before dividends and taxes in the previous 10 years on a linear time trend, scaled by the total assets of the firm in 1997. We expect all three variables to be negatively related to leverage ratios.
Two variables are used to control for cross-sectional differences in the diversification of the underwriting portfolios of insurers. We include a line of business Herfindahl index to measure the degree to which the insurer is diversified across lines of insurance and a geographical Herfindahl index based on the distribution of an insurer's premiums across states. Assuming the losses across different line of insurance or states are not perfectly correlated, we expect insurers with more diversified underwriting portfolios to have a lower volatility of earnings and therefore are better able to maintain higher degrees of leverage. However, Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) suggest agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies. Thus, firms diversifying out of their core business or geographical regions may be a signal that management has weaker incentives to maximize shareholder value (Montgomery, 1994) and will hold lower leverage.
Thus the expected signs for on the diversification variables are ambiguous.
We include two variables to control for an insurer's reinsurance strategy: the proportion of the insurer's gross premiums collected as reinsurance assumed and the proportion of the insurer's gross premiums ceded through reinsurance. We expect insurers that cede (assume) more premiums to carry lower (higher) degrees of leverage reflecting their appetites for risk.
To control for the average time to maturity for the insurer loss reserves, we utilize a variable based on the length of the payout tail for the insurer. Insurers writing long-tail lines of business face greater uncertainty regarding the ultimate losses that they will have to pay. In addition, any pricing errors will have a larger impact on the value of the insurers writing long-tailed lines. Thus, we expect a negative association between the length of the insurer's payout tail and its leverage.
We estimate the timing of the insurer's expected liability payments by first calculating claims development patterns for each line of insurance using the methodology prescribed by Taylor (1986). Thus, firms with more profitable growth opportunities will maintain less leverage to avoid the costs associated with financial distress. In addition, Lang, Ofek and Stultz (1996) suggest a negative relationship between leverage and growth exists because firms with high leverage may be unable to take advantage of growth opportunities, and because firms with poor growth opportunities should be prevented from investing in poor projects. Our proxy for future growth opportunities equals the return on assets for the insurer (this proxy assumes past growth rates are a good forecast for future growth rates). We expect firms with a higher return on assets will have a lower leverage.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) suggest tax deductions for depreciation can serve as substitutes for the tax benefits of debt financing. Under this logic, firms with lower investment related to tax shields have an incentive to employ a greater level of debt in their capital structure. Although prior empirical studies testing this hypothesis have generated mixed results, 22 we expect non-debt tax shields will be particularly important for property-liability insurance industry since the industry is known for employing sophisticated tax management strategies utilizing tax-exempt securities (Cummins and Grace 1994) . To control for the substitution benefits of tax-exempt revenue, we include a variable equal to the sum of depreciation and tax-exempt interest income divided by total assets. We expect this variable to be negatively related to leverage.
Jensen (1986) stresses the use of higher leverage as a way to limit the amount of cash flow available to managerial misappropriation. Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Lang, Stulz, and Walking (1991) , and Wells, Cox, and Gaver (1995), we control for the benefits of leverage to limit the ability by including a proxy for free cash flow equals the insurer's net income of after taxes, interest expense, and dividends paid to policyholders and stockholders, scaled by total assets. We expect this variable to be negatively related to leverage.
Our final two controls are variables designed to control for the interaction between capital decisions with firm size and insurer group affiliation. Warner (1977) and Ang, Chua, and McConnell (1982) find that larger firms have lower bankruptcy costs per dollar of assets, which suggests the costs of financial distress are lower for larger firms. Therefore, larger firms are predicted to carry higher degrees of leverage, all else equal. Our proxy for firm size is the natural log of total admitted assets. We include an indicator for insurers that operate as members of a group and are under common ownership due to the option that group affiliation provides individual insurers to call upon the capital resources of the other group members should the firm suffer a capital shock. Unaffiliated single insurance companies do not have this opportunity and therefore must make their capital decisions assuming they would seek external financing to cover severe capital shocks. Thus, we expect insurers that are members of a group will maintain higher leverage, all else equal.
Data Description and Univariate Test Results
The initial data set consisted of all property-liability insurers in the 1997 NAIC data set. From this sample we excluded insurers with premiums or surplus less than $1 million and insurers with less than 5 years of operating experience (necessary to calculate meaningful measures of cash flow volatility). 23 Our final sample consists of 1,349 observations. Descriptive statistics for the set of variables employed in this study are shown in Table 1 .
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To gain preliminary insight into our hypotheses, we partitioned insurers into separate classifications based upon the amount of business they conducted in various price-regulated
environments. An insurer was classified as "Stringently Regulated" if 50 percent of the insurer's premium volume was written in private passenger automobile or workers' compensation insurance in stringently regulated environments as identified by states with the abnormally large residual markets (see footnote 16). A second group, "Regulated Insurers", consists of firms for which 50 percent of the insurer's premium volume was subject to prior approval or state-made rate regulation and if the firm was not already a member of the stringently regulated class of insurers. All other insurers were classified as being "Unregulated". Based on this classification, there are 859 unregulated insurers and 455 regulated insurers, including 35 stringently regulated insurers. Table 2 shows the mean value for every variable in our model for each group of insurers (the standard deviations are reported below the means in parentheses). Several interesting patterns emerge. First, consistent with our theory, stringently regulated insurers have the highest average Kenney and leverage ratios followed by non-stringently regulated insurers and then by unregulated insurers. The summary statistics also show that regulated insurers are less profitable, that regulated insurers invest more in bonds but less in stocks, and that regulated insurers are significantly more concentrated in just a few states. Also, stringently regulated insurers cede more and assume less reinsurance and have a higher volatility of cash flow. Finally, we note that stringently regulated insurers are more likely to use independent agents and they tend to be smaller in terms of the amount of assets they hold. Tables 3A and 3B reports the results of t-tests and Wilcoxon (median) tests of the hypothesis that stringently regulated insurers have the highest leverage ratios followed by non-stringently regulated insurers and then by unregulated insurers. The results are consistent with our hypotheses. For example, the mean Kenney ratios for stringently regulated, non-stringently regulated, and unregulated insurers are 1.52, 1.27, and 1.12, respectively. Differences between the means and the median Kenney ratios are statistically significant at the one percent level using both a one-sided t-test and a median test, respectively. The mean leverage ratios, 2.10, 1.89, and 1.78 for stringently regulated, nonstringently regulated, and unregulated insurers, respectively, are all statistically significant at the ten percent level using a one-sided t-test. The median test for stringently versus nonstringently regulated insurers is significant at the five percent level, but the median test for nonstringently regulated versus unregulated insurers is not significant.
Regression Results
The results of the cross-sectional regression tests are shown in Tables 4A and 4B . 25 Since most of the results in both tables are similar, we focus most of our discussion on the models investigating the overall leverage ratio. Differences between the Kenney and leverage ratio models are discussed as necessary.
The results in Table 4A provide strong support for the two principal hypotheses. The coefficient on the variable measuring the proportion of the insurer's premium volume subject to price regulation is positive in all models and is significant in every case expect Model 4 where it is marginally insignificant. Thus, insurers with greater proportions of their business subject to price regulation maintain higher leverage. In addition, the coefficients on the proxy variables for regulatory stringency are all positive and significant. Thus, regardless of how we measure regulatory stringency, we find strong support for the hypothesis that insurers operating in harsh regulatory environments maintain even higher leverage than do other regulated insurers. These results are robust across different formulations of our basic model using various measures of regulation. Table 4B shows the regression results for different model formulations with the Kenney ratio as the dependent variable. In contrast to the results where the leverage ratio is the dependent variable, the variable measuring the proportion of the insurer's premium volume subject to price regulation is positive in all but one of these formulations but not statistically significant in any model. At the same time, in Table 4B , all but one of the different measures of stringent regulation are positive and statistically significant. This provides additional strong support for our second hypothesis that greater regulatory stringency will result in higher insurer leverage. Only the stringency index defined use the 25 Chow tests were conducted to test the hypothesis that the coefficient vectors are the same for regulated insurers and unregulated insurers in the Kenney and the leverage ratio regression models. The F statistics for Kenney ratio and leverage ratio were never significant. For example, F statistics for the models labeled "Model 1" in Tables 4A and 4B were 0.63 and 0.61, respectively. ECI is not statistically significant, which is likely due to its specification rather than a problem with the underlying theory.
The fact that the proportion of the insurer's business subject to prior approval or state-made rate regulation is statistically significant in Table 4A (supporting our first hypothesis) but not in Table 4B begs an explanation. As we discuss above, the leverage ratio may be a better or more sensitive measure of insurers' relative capitalization than the Kenney ratio. Also, regulation could be correlated with lower premiums, which could lead to a negative bias in that premiums are used in the numerator of the Kenney ratio. This suggests that the results for the stringency variables in Table 4B are particularly persuasive as stringent regulation also should be negatively correlated with premiums.
The results with respect to the other control variables are largely consistent with our hypotheses.
For example, the coefficients on proportion of assets in common stocks and bonds are both negative and significant at the one percent level consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher investment risk have less capacity to bear risk, and therefore, maintain less leverage. In addition, the coefficient on the proportion of investments in bonds is greater (i.e., less negative) than the coefficient for the stocks variable consistent with the intuition that common stocks are a more volatile investment class. The volatility of earnings variable is also negative and significant consistent with the hypothesis firm's with volatile cash flows hold less leverage to avoid the costs associated with financial distress.
The estimated coefficients of the proxy variables for reinsurance activities are consistent with the hypothesis that an insurer's approach to reinsurance and its capital structure are linked. The proportion of gross premiums ceded by the insurer is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that ceding more business and reducing leverage are both used to reduce financial risk. Likewise, firms with larger risk appetites appear to assume more reinsurance and maintain higher leverage at the same time.
The coefficient on the Log(Assets) variable is positive and statistically significant in both the Kenney ratio and leverage ratio regressions, consistent with the expectation that large firms require less capital due or lower costs of financial distress (Warner 1977; Ang, Chua, and McConnell 1982) . 26 The impact of size on leverage ratio is also evident and significant at the one percent level.
The indicator variable for insurers employing exclusive agency distribution systems is negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level for the Kenney ratio and at the one percent level in the leverage ratio regressions. Thus, we find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that exclusive agency systems require firm-specific investments and hold less leverage to costs of losing the investment.
The coefficient on the length of the insurer's payout tail is negative and statistically significant in the Kenney ratio regression, indicating that insurers underwriting long-tail lines of business maintain more surplus because of the greater uncertainty associated with long-tail lines. At the same time, the coefficient on the length of the payout tail is significantly positive in the leverage ratio regression. A possible explanation for the difference is that statutory accounting rules loss reserves to be reported at their nominal (non-discounted) value which will inflate the leverage for insurers writing in longtail lines of insurance.
The geographical and line of business Herfindahl indices are both positive and significant in the leverage ratio equation suggesting firms employing more focussed strategies maintain higher leverage. The results are consistent with the finding of Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) that managers diversifying a firm's operations may do so for their own benefit.
The coefficient on the free cash flow variable is significant and negative in both sets of regressions. This suggests that firms use leverage to release cash resources and therefore mitigate the conflict between owners and managers. The depreciation and tax-exempt income variable is negative and significant in the leverage equations and marginally significant in the Kenney ratio models.
Thus, we have fairly strong support for the hypothesis suggesting depreciation and income from taxexempt bonds are substitutes for the tax benefits of leverage.
The return on assets variable is negative and significant at the one percent level in both the Kenney ratio and leverage ratio equations implying firms with profitable growth opportunities maintain lower leverage to avoid costs associated with financial distress. In addition, the result is consistent with firms with poor growth opportunities maintaining high leverage to avoid investing in negative NPV projects.
Robustness Check: Capital Structure Decisions in the 1990s
All in all, both the univariate and regression results we report provide strong evidence consistent with the hypothesis there exists a linkage between the price regulatory environment and the capital decisions for insurers. An implication of these results is that as the regulatory environment becomes less contentious (i.e., regulators tend to suppress rates to a lesser degree), the incentives by insurers to hold additional levels of capital should increase. In addition, insurers with a greater proportion of business subject to price regulation should benefit more from the mitigation of the conflict between regulators and the industry.
We present additional evidence supporting this theory by investigating the change in the capital structure of the industry during the decade of the 1990's. This is a somewhat unique time period with a large amount of new equity capital entering the industry. From 1988 to 1998, the assets of the industry have grew by 94 percent while the industry's equity capital base increased by over 185 percent (A.M. Best. Aggregate and Averages, 1999) . The dramatic decline in both the Kenney ratio and the leverage ratio is apparent in Figure 1 .
Along with the substantial increase in capital over this period, the cost of private passenger automobile insurance and workers' compensation insurance declined. 27 This statement can be demonstrated in several ways. For example, in 1991, ISO filed for advisory loss cost increases (for auto insurance) in 39 states and loss cost decreases in six states. 28 By comparison, in 1998, ISO filed loss cost increases in only four states and loss cost decreases in 38 states. The downward trend in filed loss cost increases is depicted in Figure 2 . Also shown in Figure 2 is a decrease in the number of initial loss cost filings by ISO that were rejected by regulators.
Since regulatory rate suppression appears to be less severe when costs are decreasing, we would expect the effect of regulation on insurers' leverage to also decline in such an environment. To investigate this hypothesis, we calculated the leverage ratio in 1990 and in 1998 by the percentage of regulated premium to examine the change in the leverage ratio during the cost-decreasing environment of the 1990's. Figure 3 shows that the average leverage ratio in 1990 slopes downward as the percentage of regulated premium income decreases consistent with our first hypothesis.
However, this relationship is not as apparent in 1998 as insurers with more than 90 percent of their premiums in regulated markets have approximately the same level of leverage as do insurers with little or no premium in regulated markets. This result is consistent with our second hypothesis that insurers are more willing to include more surplus in their capital structures if they believe regulators are less likely to suppress rates -at least over the short term.
27 Greater vehicle safety and more stringent enforcement of traffic laws and anti-fraud provisions have contributed to lower auto insurance costs. In workers' compensation, a number of states enacted statutory changes that appear to have reduced costs. However, the environment for workers' compensation may be changing as costs have begun to increase again and further reductions in auto insurance costs may be difficult to achieve without substantial reforms of tort liability law.
V. Conclusions
This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of the relationship between price regulation and the capital decisions of firms. Our theoretical model, adapted from the general literature, demonstrates that the value of surplus for insurers subject to harsh price regulation is reduced and predicts when regulators are biased against producers, regulated will firms maintain higher leverage. Our empirical analysis provides strong and robust evidence that the degree of price regulation and its stringency have positive effects on insurers' leverage. Our results remain consistent using two different measures of leverage and several measures of regulatory stringency. Our analysis is also somewhat unique in that we measure this effect of regulation at the firm level.
In addition to our cross-sectional analysis, we present further evidence consistent with our theoretical model by examining trends in insurers' leverage over time as loss cost conditions and the severity of regulatory price constraints have eased. Our data suggest that the degree of price suppression in regulated lines of insurance appears to have decreased during the 1990s. As this has occurred, it appears that the positive effect of price regulation on insurers' leverage also has declined and virtually disappeared.
From a public policy standpoint, government intervention in a market is desirable only when severe market failures exist and government action can ameliorate the inefficiency caused by such failures. However, most scholars who have examined the insurance industry do not find an economic basis for price regulation given its structural competitiveness. Instead, many studies have shown that instead of ameliorating any inefficiencies, regulation may create market distortions. Our study further reveals that restrictive price regulation can thwart solvency goals by encouraging insurers to maintain higher levels of leverage and financial risk, all other things being equal.
Our analysis also indicates that price regulation distorts other aspects of the structure of insurance markets. We find that stringently regulated insurers are relatively small and less geographically diversified. These insurers are more subject to being "trapped" in restrictive environments and also are more vulnerable to insolvency. In addition, direct writers are more likely to skirt highly regulated markets to avoid putting their greater sunk investments at risk.
While regulatory tensions have eased and many insurers have reduced their leverage, we should not become complacent about the potential adverse effects of regulation on financial risk and solvency. The evidence suggests that loss costs and rates have begun to increase in workers' compensation (unpublished data from the NCCI, 2000). Further, regulatory tension in homeowners insurance has increased in some states with a high exposure to catastrophe risk (Klein 1998). These trends could be contributing to another round of regulator-insurer conflict over prices with adverse effects on insurer capitalization and financial risk. Of course, some insurers maintain relatively safe levels of capital despite facing stringent regulation in some markets. At the same time, a more contentious regulatory environment could have negative implications for insurers concentrated in highly regulated markets and/or that are not motivated to maintain safer levels of capital for other reasons. 50 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
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